Abstract-A geometric model of a physical network affected by a disaster is proposed and analyzed using integral geometry (geometric probability). This analysis provides a theoretical method of evaluating performance metrics, such as the probability of maintaining connectivity, and a network design rule that can make the network robust against disasters. The proposed model is of when the disaster area is much larger than the part of the network in which we are interested. Performance metrics, such as the probability of maintaining connectivity, are explicitly given by linear functions of the perimeter length of convex hulls determined by physical routes. The derived network design rule includes the following: 1) reducing the convex hull of the physical route reduces the expected number of nodes that cannot connect to the destination; 2) the probability of maintaining the connectivity of two nodes on a loop cannot be changed by changing the physical route of that loop; 3) the effect of introducing a loop is identical to that of a single physical route implemented by the straight-line route.
of damage and destruction in telecommunications networks due to the earthquake on May 12, 2008 , in China was reported [2] . Minor damage due to disasters can occur anywhere and at any moment. Therefore, it is important to construct networks robust against disaster. Higher-layer functions are normally useless when the physical connectivity of fibers is lost or network node buildings are lost. The physical design, including the geographical design of the network and its evaluation, plays a central role.
Through such experiences, network operators have made efforts to increase network robustness against disasters. For example, a large earthquake struck in 1968 in northern Japan, triggering the expansion of microwave transit systems as a means of increasing network survivability and the number of physical routes because the earthquake disconnected the network in Hokkaido, the second largest island in Japan, from the main island of Honshu due to the disconnection of the submarine cable between the two islands [3] . Another earthquake in 1993 resulted in the development of a transportable terrestrial station of a satellite communication system [3] . Nevertheless, we do not have mathematical models or mathematical frameworks for handling the effects of disasters striking in an unknown geographical location or area. This paper responds to the needs of such models or frameworks.
There has been a large number of theoretical papers published evaluating the reliability, availability, and survivability for a given network. However, most of these papers focus on a single failure (or independent failures) of a network node or a link. They take into account the topology of the network rather than its physical shape. For a given set of network topologies and failure rates of network entities, evaluation of a metric, such as the probability that a pair of network entities can be connected, is a typical example [4] . In a disaster, the assumption of a single or independent failure is not valid. In addition, the physical shape of a network is important for evaluating the impact of a disaster on network survivability. However, most studies have not covered this point.
Several studies of network survivability have been reported that take into account correlated failure and geometric/geographical conditions. Grubesic [5] evaluated the network survivability of the current Internet based on geographical data. Although he focused on the physical route of a network, it was a case study, and no mathematical models or methods were provided. Liew and Lu [6] proposed a framework to evaluate network survivability during a disaster and introduced a survivability function to various metrics. Although their framework can introduce correlated failures, they did not propose any method or model of correlations, and they assumed that the independence of failures and the failure rate was proportional to the link length. Furthermore, they did not consider the physical shape of the disaster area or that of the network due to the lack of a mathematical framework. Saito [7] proposed a method for evaluating the probability of disconnection between two nodes when the disaster area can be modeled as a half-plane and a node or a link in the disaster area fails with a given probability. Wu et al. [8] discussed the optimization of the physical route of an undersea cable by assuming a disk-shaped disaster area. By assuming a rectangular route, the length of an edge is determined by minimizing cost while maintaining a higher probability of connecting two cities than the threshold. Cao et al. [9] extended this work to other route shape cases. Gardner et al. [10] also considered a disk-shaped disaster model to analyze whether the source and destination are connected.
Taking into account a disaster area, the minimum number of cuts disconnecting the source and sink nodes was discussed in the following papers. As far as we know, Bienstock [11] initiated the study of this problem. Algorithms for computing the minimum number of disaster areas disconnecting the source and sink nodes were investigated when all the edges intersecting the disaster areas are removed. Sen et al. [12] proposed regionbased connectivity as a metric for fault tolerance. Assuming a region is a disk-shaped disaster area, polynomial-time algorithms for calculating region-based connectivity are provided. Neumayer et al. [13] discussed the geographical min-cut, defined as the minimum number of disk-shaped disaster areas to disconnect a pair of nodes, and the geographical max-flow, defined as the maximum number of paths that are not disconnected by a single disaster area, and showed that geographical min-cut is not equal to geographical max-flow. Agarwal et al. studied algorithms that find a disaster location having the highest expected impact on a network, in which the impact is defined by various metrics such as the number of failed components [14] . Zhang Yinfa et al. [15] evaluated the risk of each region by searching the worst line-cut. Trajanovski et al. [16] also studied this category and proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a critical region and a region-disjoint path. An important contribution of that study is to show that three points can determine the location of an elliptical or a polygon disaster area.
Recently, Neumayer et al. published two papers intended to cover network survivability in a disaster [17] , [18] . In one of their introductions [17] , they stated that, "we are the first to attempt to study this problem." In their network model, there is a set of line segments of which endpoints are locations of network center buildings and the disaster model is a line segment or a circle [17] . They proposed to use an optimization technique to find the worst-case disaster. On the other hand, Neumayer and Modiano [18] used geometric probability (integral geometry) to model the randomness of a disaster. Their network model is, again, a set of line segments of which endpoints are locations of network center buildings and the disaster model is a line. These papers also emphasize a polynomial-order algorithm to evaluate metrics.
Forecasting the time, even the location and size of a disaster, is often difficult. For example, although research on earthquakes in Japan is quite extensive, the size of the disaster area from the earthquake on March 11, 2011, was far beyond expectations. Towns that were expected to be safe from tsunamis were engulfed, and districts that had never experienced a strong earthquake were affected by intense shaking. This shows that the frequency of disasters is too low to make an accurate disaster area model based on statistics. There are also many types of disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, landslides, wildfires, tornados, extraordinarily heavy snowfall, and electromagnetic pulses. Furthermore, network operators have many subnetworks such as subscriber and regional. There are too many combinations of disasters and subnetworks to evaluate all cases individually. Therefore, it is beneficial for network operators to use a method for assessing network survivability that is applicable to generic subnetworks without specific disaster information and to provide a rule of thumb for designing robust networks. Based on this motivation, a disaster area is modeled as an area randomly placed around a network. With use of integral geometry (geometric probability), explicit formulas for performance metrics, such as the probability that a pair of nodes still maintain connections, can be derived. The analyzed results lead us to a network design that can improve robustness against a disaster.
The integral geometry (geometric probability) used in this paper is a mathematical method for evaluating the measures that a certain set (normally a subset of a plane) satisfies certain characteristics and has been used in several papers regarding sensor networks as well as that by Neumayer and Modiano [18] . For example, a series of papers [19] [20] [21] , based on analysis using integral geometry, proposed shape estimation methods for a target object based on reports from sensor nodes of unknown locations. Lazos et al. [22] and Lazos and Poovendran [23] directly applied the results of the integral geometry discussed in [24, Ch. 5, Sec. 6.7 ] to the analysis of detecting an object moving in a straight line and to the evaluation of the probability of -coverage. Kwon and Shroff [25] also applied integral geometry to the analysis of straight-line routing, which is an approximation of the shortest path routing, and Choi and Das [26] used it to determine sensors in energy-conserving data gathering.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. 1) This paper discusses a theoretical method for evaluating network survivability metrics, such as connectivity probability, when the physical network and disaster area shapes are given. 2) This theoretical method explicitly reveals the relationships between network survivability metrics and physical network shape when the disaster area is geographically much larger than the length between two nodes of interest and its boundary is macroscopically a line. For example, the probability of connectivity between two nodes connected by a single route is a linear function of the perimeter length of the convex hull of the physical route. 3) By using the relationships between network survivability metrics and physical network shape, principles useful in designing a physical route of a network are derived. For example; i) reducing the convex hull of the physical route reduces the expected number of nodes disconnected to the destination; ii) the probability of maintaining the connectivity of two nodes on a convex ring network is not dependent on the geographical shape of the physical route of that network; and iii) the straight-line route maximizes the probability of maintaining connectivity when a single route is used. When the straight-line route is not practical, a loop replacing the single route can achieve the same probability of maintaining connectivity that the straight-line achieves. As a result, we can obtain a physical network shape that is robust against a disaster and the rule of thumb for designing such a physical network. 4) It is valid to adopt a half-plane as a disaster area model, when the bumps of the actual disaster area boundary are small or the interval of two bumps is short compared to the mean distance between two nodes and when the disaster area is much larger than the (sub)network of interests. The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II explains the proposed model. Section III introduces a basic explanation of integral geometry and geometric probability and derives a basic theorem for the analysis in later sections. Section IV discusses the analysis results when the disaster area is much larger than the area of interest, and Section V discusses numerical examples. Section VI concludes the paper. is the boundary of . That is, . This paper investigates a physical network, such as an optical fiber network, within a bounded and convex . This is the area of interest, and disasters causing damage in part of are taken into account.
Let be the nodes in the network, and let be the physical link between two consecutive nodes and . When there are routes between nodes and , let be its th physical route. and . For a ring-type network, it is assumed that there is connectivity between two nodes if at least a clockwise or counterclockwise route between these two nodes is maintained. For a ring-type network, it is assumed that the area of which boundary is is convex for the remainder of this paper. (For simplicity, we denote " is convex" in the remainder of this paper. However, it formally means that the area of which boundary is is convex.) A network affected by a disaster is analyzed. With no prior information of the disaster, the disaster area is modeled as a randomly placed area around a network in . The disaster area is modeled as a realization of a spatially stationary process. It is assumed that the portion of the network included in does not work at all. That is, no network elements function in .
In the remainder of this paper, it is assumed that a disaster area is geographically much larger than the length between two nodes of interest. For example, the disaster area of a large earthquake is at least hundreds of km . Some may reach tens of thousands of km . A large hurricane can create a disaster area larger than 100 km . Therefore, this assumption is useful, for example, for evaluating a disaster affecting a small subnetwork, such as a subscriber network, or for designing a robust physical route of such a network against disasters. Because is very large, we can assume that its boundary area is macroscopically a line but microscopically has bumps. The proposed model is a strip with a half-plane . That is, is a model in which the boundary is rugged within breadth (Fig. 1) .
For a directional , is assumed to be , that is . Because we assume that a part of the network in does not work at all, this model is identical to that in which the boundary of is a line . This assumption underestimates the probabilities of connectivities under the assumption that a part of the network in the actual disaster area does not work at all (Fig. 1) . However, as a network operator, this safe-side assumption is adopted to obtain a feasible rule of thumb. To show the validity of this model of , we discuss the simulation results in Section V.
The following is a list of notations used in the remainder of this paper.
• means that there is connectivity between nodes and .
• means that the connectivity is lost between and .
• means a straight-line segment of which the two endpoints are and (this is equivalent to the convex hull of and ). Sometimes, for example, is used. This means that and .
III. PRELIMINARIES
To analyze the relationship between the shape of the network and the effect of a disaster, this section provides mathematical preliminaries.
A. Introduction of Integral Geometry and Geometric Probability
The concept of integral geometry and geometric probability [24] is introduced as a preliminary for evaluating a disaster occurring at a random location.
For a bounded set in two-dimensional space , we can define the motion-invariant measure of the set of positions of satisfying the condition , where the position of is determined by the position of its reference point and by its direction formed by a reference line fixed in with another reference line fixed to the fixed coordinates. An example of is for a given . By moving over a domain satisfying in the parameter space of , we obtain the motion-invariant measure of the set of positions of satisfying . That is, is the area size of the parameter space of satisfying . This "moving " is denoted as and called the kinematic density. In fact,
. That is, "moving " is "moving ". Consequently, the measure is defined by the size of the area in which the positions of satisfy in the parameter space of . Once we have defined the measures and , the probability that the position of satisfying among the position of satisfying is defined by the quotient of measures . This is called a geometric probability. That is, the geometric probability is proportional to the measure and is normalized by . In this sense, the measure is a nonnormalized probability when the parameters and of move uniformly over the parameter space.
Similarly, we can define the measure of a set of lines. Consider a line determined by the angle , in which the direction perpendicular to makes a fixed angle with the positive part of the -axis , and by its distance from the origin (Fig. 2) . That is, is specified by the coordinates . By using the coordinates and the criterion of motion-invariance, the motion-invariant measure of the set of lines satisfying is defined by the simple integral form [24] . (We can use another parameterization, but we cannot use this simple integral form. This is because integral geometry requires the calculated results to be invariant under the group of motions in the plane and because another parameterization requires a complicated form to make motion-invariant.) Throughout this paper, any boundary of a set in is smooth and differentiable except for the finite number of points.
B. Lemma and Theorem
This section provides a lemma and a theorem for the analysis in the following sections. For a bounded area in , we use the following notations in the remainder of this paper:
• : boundary of : • : perimeter length of : • : convex hull of . In later sections, in the following lemma and theorem is, for example, a route between two nodes. Then, the following theorem provides a probability that a route intersects a disaster area. Lemma 1: Let be a set in . The event is equivalent to , and the event is equivalent to (Fig. 3 ). This is almost trivial because or is a half-plane. Theorem 1: Let be a set in and assume that where (area of interest) is bounded and convex. Then
The proof of a general case is shown in the Appendix, and the proof of the case in which and are disks is shown here. This proof is helpful to understand the proof of a general case.
Assume that is a disk of radius and the origin is set at the center of . Assume that is a disk of radius and that its center is located at [ Fig. 4(a) ]. Proof: Express with parameters . For a fixed , the range of that satisfies is . Here, is the distance between the origin and when is a tangent line of . The positions of are illustrated in Fig. 4(a) when and when . The range of that satisfies is . The position of is illustrated in Fig. 4(a) when . Therefore, the range of that satisfies is . Hence See Fig. 4(b) . This figure highlights the region around two centers. According to this figure, . Therefore, . Thus
Because the range of that satisfies is for a fixed (4) Note that . According to the definition of geometric probability,
. From (3) and (4), we obtain (1). 
IV. ANALYSIS
In the rest of this section, cases in which are of focus. To simplify the notation, the description for this area of focus is omitted in the remainder of the paper.
Remark: This area of focus means that disasters causing damage in part of are taken into account, but disasters that affect the entire are removed. If those disasters affecting the entire are taken into account, the measure of becomes infinite because is a half-plane. As a result, cannot be appropriately determined. Because of this technical reason, the cases in which are of focus. However, even under this focus, the cases in which a subnetwork of interest is completely included in can be considered. By appropriately setting , there are no practical problems caused by this focus.
A. Single Route Path
Result 1: When consists of a single route, the probability that there is connectivity between and is given by (5) Proof: The event is equivalent to the event that any part of is not in . Apply (1) to and obtain (5) .
Surprisingly, can be given by a simple explicit function of , and is determined only by . That is, for fixed , is not dependent on the length of or the size of . The result mentioned above tells us the following. First, if there is an intermediate node between and (Fig. 5) , is proportional to . That is, the decrease in the probability of maintaining connectivity due to the increase in the number of hops is proportional to the increase in the perimeter length of the convex hull of the route. Therefore, if the increase in the perimeter length of the convex hull of the route is not large, the decrease in the probability of maintaining connectivity due to the increase in the number of hops is not large. For example, is larger in Fig. 5 (a) than in Fig. 5(b) because the increase in the perimeter length of the convex hull of the route is larger in the former than in the latter. Second, is smaller as increases. Hence, it is likely that is smaller if and are far away or the route between them is more nonroundabout [ Fig. 5(a) ] than roundabout [ Fig. 5(b) ] for fixed route length. Third, among all pairs, becomes worst for the pair of which is the largest. Equation (5) Let be the probability that there is connectivity between and all these nodes . Then (6) Proof: The event is equivalent to . According to (1), we obtain (6).
It is likely that is large when a network covers a physically wide area. Thus, it is difficult to maintain the connectivity of the entire network during a disaster if the network covers a physically wide area. The difference in for a small network and that for a large network is proportional to the difference in for these two networks.
B. Ring-Type Network
Result 3: Assume that is a ring-type network. Nodes and are connected if at least one clockwise route or counterclockwise route of this network is maintained. Then, if and only if , and its probability is given as follows: (7) This probability does not increase even if additional routes are provided between nodes on this ring-type network (Fig. 6) .
Proof: First, assume that is a ring-type network. That is, no additional routes are assumed to be provided. without additional routes, at least one of is in . This is because case (iii) does not occur, as mentioned above. Therefore, no additional routes increase because at least one of is in . Equation (7) tells us that we cannot change by changing the physical route of the ring-type network for fixed locations of and . This is because the right-hand side of (7) does not depend on . Comparing (7) to (5), we find that the effect of the clockwise and counterclockwise routes on for a ring-type network is equal to the replacement of the ring-type with the single straight-line-segment physical route between and . This is actually intuitive. Due to the convexity of the ring-type network and the fact that the boundary of the disaster area model is a line, the event that the ring-type network intersects is identical to the event that the straight-line segment between and intersects (Fig. 7) .
C. Combination of Single Route Path and Ring-Type Network
An actual network is not as simple as a tree or a ring and uses mechanisms to improve the availability of the network. In this section, the results on more practical situations are discussed.
The latter part of the following result is useful to evaluate cases in which is equipped with a higher-layer switch or a server.
Result 4: Assume that path configuration between and consists of two parts: The first part between and is a single route path, and the second part between and is a ring-type network where is convex [ Fig. 8(a) ]. The probability that there is connectivity between and is given by (8) Assume that path configuration between and consists of four parts: the first part between and and the fourth part between and are single route paths, and the second and third parts and are convex ring-type networks on the same ring network [ Fig. 8(b) ]. The probability is given by (9) Proof: The event is equivalent to the joint event of and for case (a). The event is equivalent to . Due to Lemma 1, this is equivalent to . The event is equivalent to because of Result 3. Note that is equivalent to . By applying (1), we obtain (8). The event is equivalent to the event . According to Result 3, is equivalent to . Therefore, is equivalent to . This is equivalent to . According to (1) and , we obtain (9). Result 5: Assume that path configuration between and consists of two parts: The first part is a ring-type network between and , and the second part is a single route for . Let be the probability that there is connectivity between and all of these nodes . Then (10) Proof: The event is equivalent to . By using (1) and , we obtain (10). How using a backup node improves the probability of maintaining connectivity is now discussed.
Result 6: Assume that there are two nodes and on a ring network. The path configurations and consist of two parts: The first part is a single route path, and the second part ( or ) is a ring-type network. The path configurations and form the same convex ring-type network. The probability or that there is connectivity between and at least one of and is given by or (11) Assume that there are nodes on a ring network and that and are the nearest destination nodes on the clockwise route and counterclockwise route on the ring network from , respectively (Fig. 9) . Then or or (12) Proof: The event that there is connectivity between and one of and is equivalent to the event or . To evaluate the measure of this event, we need to divide it into two subevents and remove the overlap: The first subevent is , and the second subevent is . Because their overlap is , or . Similar to (1), we obtain (11) .
If there is connectivity between and one of nodes , there is connectivity between and at least and . Therefore, (12) is valid. Equation (11) tells us that the effect of a backup node on or is . This effect is numerically evaluated with numerical examples discussed in a later section. Equation (12) shows that more than two backup nodes are meaningless for a given .
The following result is an extension of the latter part of Result 4. That is, it covers cases in which a higher-layer switch or a server at has a backup . Result 7: Assume that there are two nodes and on a ring network. To connect between and , one of them must be connected. The path configuration consists of three parts (Fig. 10) : The first and third parts , are single route paths, and the second part is a little bit complicated. When is used, the second part consists of two ring-type networks and ( and ). The probability that there is connectivity between and through either or is given as follows: or ( 
13)
Proof: The event in which there is connectivity between and through either or is equivalent to or . To evaluate the measure of this event, divide this event into two subevents and remove the overlap: The first subevent is , and the second subevent is . The measures of these two subevents are given by the numerator of (9). The overlap is . This is identical to . Therefore, the measure of this overlap is . As a result, we obtain (13) .
We learn that the effect of a backup node on the probability that there is connectivity between and through at least one or is quite similar to that on or . Replacing a single route path in (11) with the union of two single route paths gives us (13) .
D. Number of Nodes Losing Connectivity
Let us discuss how we minimize the expected number of subscribers or nodes losing connectivity.
Result 8: Let be a set of nodes and be the number of nodes in disconnected from . If is a single route path for (14) If is a ring-type network for (15) Proof: Note that where if is true otherwise. Then, we obtain (14) through (5). Similarly, we can obtain (15) by using (7) . Therefore, to reduce , reduction of is necessary for a single route. Thus, its physical route that minimizes is identical to every being on a straight line when the locations of the nodes are fixed. In practice, because there are many constraints, such as alignment with the road and minimizing cost (including minimizing the total length of the cable and maximizing the number of fibers in use in a cable) in determining the physical route, the straight-line route is difficult. By choosing the physical route that minimizes among the feasible routes, however, we can reduce . In particular, even when the length of the route is the same, we can reduce and, as a result, . Fig. 11 shows such an example. The lengths of Routes 1 and 2 are the same, but the perimeter length of the convex hull of Route 1 is shorter than that of Route 2.
A very good point of (14) is that we can reduce by reducing independently of the path configuration of other source-destination pairs. Hence, reducing (as a result, reducing ) can be implemented easily without burden of computation.
On the other hand, as described just after Result 3, does not depend on the physical route if the locations of and are fixed and is a ring-type network. Thus, we cannot reduce by changing the physical route. Although the above result does not refer to other types of path configuration other than a single route path or a ring-type network, it is trivial that we can obtain if we know because .
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In the following numerical examples, is assumed for any case if not explicitly indicated otherwise. This is because we can easily obtain the probability connecting two nodes for by (the probability connecting two nodes for ).
A. Subscriber Network
By using (5), is evaluated for the network model shown in Fig. 12(a) . Here, is a local network center providing a local switch to connect two subscribers in this subscriber network and is located at the bottom left corner in this figure. In addition, can be evaluated for the network model shown in Fig. 12(b) by using (9) . It can also evaluated for the real subscriber network shown in Fig. 13 . Figs. 14 and 15 plot after sorting them in descending order of their exact values. In these figures, "Exact" is given by (5) for (a) and by (9) for (b); "Independent approx." is given by , each of which is derived by (5) for (a) and by (8) for (b); "Line approx." is given by (5) under the assumption that the physical route between and is given by a straight line (a flybird connection [28] , [29] , so to speak); and " Independent line approx." is given by under the assumption that the physical route between ( ) and is given by a straight line. A simulation was conducted assuming that to confirm the verification of " Exact." Because the simulation results were in very good agreement with "Exact," we cannot see "Exact" overlapping with the simulation results. [The average sizes of the 95% confidence intervals of the simulation are 0.0182, 0.0183, and 0.0190 for the network shown in Figs. 12(a) , 12(b), and 13].
As expected, the independent approximation underestimates and the line approximation overestimates . This is because the independent approximation ignores the correlations that the two routes (between and and between and ) are damaged simultaneously and because the line approximation ignores the fact that the actual physical route is longer than the straight-line route. Independent line approximation is almost similar to independent approximation. Line approximation shows us the minimum by changing the physical route. Its effect is not so large in this figure. In addition, the effect of the introduction of the local loop can be evaluated for real subscriber network.
by the difference between under (a) the tree model and that under (b) the loop model for each pair of and . Of course, the difference is always nonnegative, but it is very small in this example. It is less than 3% (its relative value is less than 10%) for any pair of and , and it is less than 1% on average (its relative value is less than 2% on average).
B. Effect of Backup Node
Based on (7) and (11), we evaluated the effect of a backup node for the model shown in Fig. 16 . A regional network center is located on a ring network, which is a circle with radius . The angle formed by the line segment between and the center of the ring network and the reference line is . When the other regional network center as a backup is provided, the angle of the line passing and and the reference line is . There are multiple nodes on the same ring network, where the angle between two consecutive nodes is . Let be the set of these nodes. Similar to derivation of (14) , and or or . Because is given by (7) and or is given by (11) with and , , we can numerically minimize by changing the location of and by changing the locations of and . and are plotted in Fig. 17 . In this figure: 1) as the number of nodes increases, almost linearly increases; and 2) as increases, slightly increases. Therefore, for a network with many nodes or for a physically large network, we need to provide a backup node.
C. Validity of Strip Model
The boundary area of a disaster area is assumed to be a strip in the numerical examples in this section when is much larger than the distance between two nodes of interest. This assumption may be valid in a macroscopic view, but it is not likely in a microscopic view.
1) Sine Wave Boundary:
To evaluate the impact of the micro shape of the boundary, a simulation was conducted that uses a sine wave as the boundary of . Fig. 18 plots the mean relative absolute error for two cases (tree model in Fig. 12 and real subscriber network shown in Fig. 13) , where is the relative absolute error defined by . Here, is obtained by (5), and is that obtained by simulation when the sine wave with amplitude and wavelength is used as the boundary. The unit length of this graph is the mean distance between two individual subscribers. The two graphs in Fig. 18 look similar. Therefore, the characteristics shown here seem valid for many cases. 1) If or , the strip model is valid. That is, the strip model can cover the boundary bump occurring in a period shorter than half the mean distance between two individual nodes or bumps smaller than half the mean distance between two individual nodes. We can ignore the variation in the boundary smaller than or within an interval shorter than half the mean distance between two individual nodes.
2) The relative absolute error rapidly becomes large when and . Therefore, if variations in the boundary satisfy and , we need the model to take into account this variation.
2) Actual Earthquake Disaster Area: This example uses disaster area maps showing past earthquake intensities stronger than 5 on the Japanese scale of 7 as . The maps are released by the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) [30] . There are eight maps from which the whole shape of is be obtained. In addition, another map provided by [31] for the earthquake that occurred in 1995 was also used. Of course, the boundary of is not a line, and each may have several separated subareas.
For each earthquake used as , simulation was conducted for the network models shown in Fig. 19 : is randomly placed. If , determine whether . As a result, we obtain to compare . Fig. 20 plots the results for two network models, where nine earthquakes are identified by the date the earthquake occurred. The theoretical results shown in this paper were derived from (5) for the first network model and (7) for the second network model. It is clear that, as the networks become smaller (that is, becomes relatively larger), obtained by simulation converges to the theoretical value of . This is evidence that the proposed model and method are valid.
VI. CONCLUSION
A geometric model was proposed for evaluating the impact of a disaster on a network and was analyzed through integral geometry (geometric probability). The validity of this model was evaluated through simulation. The simulation results show that the proposed model is valid when the bumps are small or the interval of two bumps are short compared to the mean distance between two nodes, and when the disaster area is much larger than the (sub)network of interests.
Performance metrics were derived, such as the probability of maintaining connection between two nodes, as explicit functions of the physical route shape. They are linear functions of perimeter lengths of convex hulls determined by physical route shape.
The results showed the following rules of thumb for designing a network robust against disasters when the disaster area is much larger than the (sub)network of interest. 1) Reducing the convex hull of the path configuration reduces the expected number of nodes that cannot connect to the destination. 2) For two given nodes on a convex ring-type network, is independent of the physical route of the ring-type network. That is, we cannot change by changing the physical route.
3) When a single route is provided between two nodes, the straight-line route maximizes the probability of maintaining the connectivity between them irrespective of the disaster area. When it is difficult to adopt the straight-line route, the effect of introducing a loop is identical to that. It is assumed that a disaster area can be modeled by an area randomly placed around a network. This assumption is based on the consideration that we cannot forecast the locations or shapes for many types of disasters. In particular, the relative location of the disaster area and subnetworks is not known. Therefore, under no such prior information, the proposed model is valid as a first-step approximation. However, for a specific type of disaster, we may obtain information about the disaster location. For such cases, an assessment method for network survivability using such information is for further study. In addition, the assumption of convexity of a ring-type network is also a first-step approximation.
APPENDIX
We are now in a position to prove a general case of Theorem 1.
Proof: First, assume that is a convex set. Take an origin in and consider support functions and for and . In general, a support function for provides a set of lines, and each line in the set is called a line of support for . A line of support for is a tangent line of . (Formally, it is a line containing at least one of , but such that one of the two open half planes determined by the line contains no point of (Fig. 21) [27]). Express with parameters . For a fixed , the range of that satisfies is and that satisfies is . Fig. 22 illustrates the reason. In this figure, the two strips correspond to the two positions of . One position corresponds to , and the other corresponds to . At these positions of , becomes identical to a tangent line of (formally, a line of support of ). Therefore, is given by or because the distance of a tangent line (a line of support) from the origin is given by the value of its support function (see Fig. 21 ).
in contact with in this figure shows the position of with . At this position of , becomes identical to a tangent line of (formally, a line of support of ). Therefore, is given by . As a result, the range of that satisfies is . Thus (16) When is a support function for , the following relationship is known between and its perimeter length : [24] . Note that is a support function of . Thus, . Similarly, . Therefore (17) Because, the range of that satisfies is for a fixed (18) According to the definition of geometric probability (19) Thus, we obtain (1).
When is not a convex set, consider instead of . Then, . By using Lemma 1, we obtain (1).
